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A Fault Attack on Pairing Based Cryptography

Dan Page, Fre Vercauteren, A Fault Attack on Pairing Based Cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 55(9), pp. 1075–1080. July 2006. No electronic version available.

Abstract

Current fault attacks against public key cryptography focus on traditional schemes such as RSA and ECC, and to a lesser extent primitives such as XTR. However, bilinear maps, or pairings, have presented theorists with a new and increasingly popular way of constructing cryptographic protocols. Most notably, this has resulted in efficient methods for Identity Based Encryption (IBE). Since identity based cryptography seems an ideal partner for identity aware devices such as smart-cards, in this paper we examine the security of concrete pairing instantiations in terms of fault attack.

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