About Me

I am a research assistant in the Cryptography Group. My supervisor is Elisabeth Oswald.

My research interests are in the area of side-channel attacks, in particular the utility of high-performance GPGPU computing in side-channel attacks and leakage detection, and also when applied to attacks on web application and network traffic.

Contact

Address

• Luke Mather
• Department of Computer Science
• University of Bristol
• Merchant Venturers Building
• Woodland Road
• Bristol
• BS8 1UB
• United Kingdom

Email

firstname(dot)surname(at)bristol(dot)ac(dot)uk

Publications

5. • Multi-target DPA attacks: Pushing DPA beyond the limits of a desktop computer
   • Luke Mather, Elisabeth Oswald and Carolyn Whitnall
   • Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt 2014, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 8873, pages 243-261, Springer, December 2014
   • A preliminary version of this paper is available from the Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/365.
4. • Does My Device Leak Information? An a priori Statistical Power Analysis of Leakage Detection Tests
   • Luke Mather, Elisabeth Oswald, Joe Bandenburg and Marcin Wójcik
   • Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 8269, pages 486-505. Springer, December 2013
3. • Pinpointing Side-Channel Information Leaks in Web Applications
   • Luke Mather and Elisabeth Oswald
   • Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, volume 2(3), pages 161-177. Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, October 2012.
2. • Choosing Distinguishers for Differential Power Analysis Attacks
   • Elisabeth Oswald, Luke Mather and Carolyn Whitnall
   • NIST Non-Invasive Attack Testing Workshop (NIAT), September 2011 (pdf).
1. • An Exploration of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test as a Competitor to Mutual Information Analysis
   • Carolyn Whitnall, Elisabeth Oswald and Luke Mather
   • Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 7079, pages 234-251. Springer, September 2011.
   • A preliminary version of this paper is available from the Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/380.