Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystemsR. Avanzi, Simon Hoerder, Dan Page, Michael Tunstall, Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 1(4), pp. 271–281. November 2011. No electronic version available.
Research within "post-quantum" cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al., and novel countermeasures against such attack.